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When environmental quality enters random utility models linearly, welfare measures are
convex in quality.  The convexity is partly due to site substitution, and it has implications for whether
changes in quality should be concentrated or diffuse.  The effects of functional form are illustrated in
a model of Great Lakes fishing.
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Increasing at an Increasing Rate: The Potential Convexity
of Discrete-Choice Welfare Measures
In the environmental economics literature environmental benefit functions are commonly used
in optimization frameworks.  To facilitate solutions, environmental benefits are usually assumed to
be increasing concave functions of environmental quality (or environmental damages are assumed to
be increasing convex functions of pollutants).  In practice, one way to derive an environmental benefit
function is to use the travel cost method to relate the demand for recreation to environmental quality
at specific recreation sites.  Use-values for changes in environmental quality can then be obtained from
the recreation demand model.  Discrete-choice models such as the random utility model (RUM)
dominate the modern literature on recreation demand.  However, one point that has not to have
received much attention is that welfare measures for changes in site quality from discrete-choice
models are often convex in site quality.  
Here, it is shown that when the indirect utility of recreation sites is specified using the linear
form, individual and aggregate welfare measures based on RUM site-choice models must be convex
in site quality.  Hence, environmental benefit functions derived from RUM-based models will be
convex in site quality whenever site utility is linear in quality.  The convexity of the benefit function
has nothing to do with the specification of the RUM error terms or the researcher's uncertainty about
the individual RUM welfare measures.  Rather, the convexity is a result of the underlying discrete
nature of the choices.  The rationale is straightforward: increases in quality at a site yield utility to
current users and to new users who are induced to switch sites.  It is the site-substitution effect that
leads to the convexity of the welfare measure.  Moreover, it is shown that even if individual utility
functions for sites are concave in site quality, the aggregate welfare measure will be locally convex
whenever the incremental utility to new users offsets the diminishing incremental utility to existing2
users.  For site utility functions that are logarithmic in quality, the range of parameters that ensure
concavity is demonstrated.  
An empirical example illustrates these effects by specifying indirect utility as linear and non-
linear functions of site quality.  Each of the functional forms is applied to data on the site choices for
Great Lakes trout and salmon anglers in Michigan.  The catch rate for trout and salmon is used as the
environmental quality variable, and each of the models is estimated as a multinomial logit.  Non-
nested statistical tests of model fit provide weak evidence that a logarithmic form (log of catch rates)
is preferred for the example considered.  The illustration demonstrates that the resulting welfare
measures for increases and decreases in catch rates are remarkably different depending on the linear
or non-linear forms.  
While the model specification issues addressed by the paper have received little attention in
the recreation demand literature, the paper is not just about which functional form fits the data best.
The ultimate point is that the differing functional forms support opposite policy rules for the general
management of environmental quality, namely whether to concentrate or spread out changes in
environmental quality (Helfand and Rubin).
The Random Utility Model (RUM)
The literature contains several expositions of the theory of discrete-choice known as the
random utility model (McFadden, 1981 and 1997; Small and Rosen; Hanemann 1982 and 1983; Train;
Ben-Akiva and Lerman; Morey), and reviews in the recreational demand context are given by
Freeman; and Bockstael et al., 1984 and 1992.  The RUM choice problem can be stated as choosing
the alternative k that maximizes the conditional indirect utility U , that is,  k
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for all k￿k'.  This becomes a "random" utility model by recognizing that not all attributes that affect
utility can be observed by the researcher.  Thus, researchers must predict the probability that any
alternative is the best in the choice set as follows:
    B =  Pr [ U >U ,..., U >U , U >U ,..., U >U  ].  (2) k         k0    k k-1    k k+1    kK
The choice probabilities serve as the expected demand functions for alternatives in the choice set.
The conditional utility function is typically assumed to be  
U =  V +  , , (3) k   k  k
where V is the deterministic portion of utility to be estimated, and , is a stochastic portion known to
individuals but not to researchers.  In practice, researchers commonly adopt the linear form, V  = µ(Y- k
p)  +  $q , where µ is the marginal utility of income and $ is a vector of marginal utilities associated k    k
with a vector of characteristics q .    k
To derive an econometric model, one assumes a distribution for the error terms in (3).  When
the errors are assumed to be i.i.d. from a type 1 extreme value (EV) distribution, the choice
probabilities will have the familiar multinomial logit (MNL) form
Thus, the B (expected demands) depend on the prices and qualities of all alternatives.   j
Welfare Measures in RUMs 
Recall that in the RUM, individuals are assumed to choose the site yielding the highest utility
(the best site).  The nature of the problem implies that individuals only get utility from changes in
quality when they actually use the site where quality changes, i.e., only use values matter.  For any
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of the old best site and the indirect utility of the new best site.  Thus, changes in site quality only have
value when they occur at the best site or when they are large enough so that the site where quality
changes becomes the best site.  This insight will be useful in establishing the shape of the aggregate
benefits function derived from the RUMs.  
Deriving the RUM welfare measures is complicated by the fact that the error terms, ,, are
unknown to the researcher.  We begin by ignoring this uncertainty and focussing on the logic of the
welfare measure.  Under certainty and full knowledge of the error terms for each individual,
compensating variation for a change in prices and quality from (p ,q ) to (p ,q ) would be:
00   11
From this expression, it is clear that if a policy change does not affect the best site before or the best
site after a change, then the CV for that change will be zero.  That is, if a policy change does not affect
sites that are being used, then the policy does not generate use value.  
Of course, the preceding assumes the ,'s are known, yet the essence of the RUM is that the ,'s
are not known.  Since the utilities in (6) are random variables, the maximum utility is also a random
variable, so the CV itself is a random variable (Hanemann, 1982).  One way to deal with this is to
calculate the expected CV -- typically a complex matter when the errors follow anything other than
extreme values distributions.  Here we focus on EV errors, though the results also apply to GEV.  With
EV distributions, the expected maximum conditional indirect utility is given by the "inclusive value,"
IV = ln(3 e ) (Johnson and Kotz; McFadden, 1978).  The IV function has two convenient properties: i
Vi 
(1) the first derivatives with respect to the deterministic indirect utilities are the estimated probabilities
(McFadden 1981; Hanemann, 1983), and (2) the second derivatives are the marginal effects on the












































Using the inclusive value notion, if the error terms are EV and income enters V linearly, then
expected CV is given by
The above equation has long been utilized as a benefits measure for recreational demand models based
on the RUM (Hanemann, 1982; Bockstael et al., 1984).  The expression provides a means of
evaluating complex arrays of changes in site quality and prices as well as site closures and additions.
Using (7) and (8), with the linear utility function we have 
where µ is the negative of the price parameter and $  is the utility parameter on quality characteristics. q
The later term is the marginal welfare measures for a change in resource quality at site j, q, (Hanemann j
1983; McFadden 1981).  
The Shape of the Benefits Function
In the literature on recreational site choices, there is little discussion of the basic properties
(the shape) of the RUM welfare measure (Hanemann, 1983, is an exception).  The shape is important
in the use of the benefits function for benefit cost analysis and for general policy prescriptions.  In this
section, it is demonstrated that the benefits functions derived from discrete choice models are convex











Figure 1:  Benefits Function with Linear V.
implications for the use of these models to derive "optimal" levels of environmental quality.   
To establish the shape of B, we make use of the properties of the IV function given in (9).
Again assuming a linear V, these properties imply the following
Since the probabilities must be non-negative, it is clear that the IV function is increasing in q if $>0. j
Moreover, the benefits function is convex in changes in site quality.  The first point, that the marginal
benefit of a change in quality is dependent on the probability of a site, has been discussed by
Hanemann (1983).  This fundamental insight results in policy prescriptions such as an improvement
in quality is more valuable at more popular sites than at less popular sites.  Alternatively, when
benefits of environmental quality at various sites are specified as increasing at a decreasing rate, then
the policy prescription would be to allocate given increments of quality to the sites with the lowest
quality (provided the marginal costs are the same). 
Figure 1 illustrates the shape of the benefits
function for some hypothetical sites and numbers.
Quality is graphed on the horizontal axis.  The site
probability function is also shown (labeled B). j
Two alternative functions are shown from two
alternative initial quality levels, q  and q .  For
a   b
simplicity, assume that µ=1, so that the two
benefits functions can be labeled IV(q)-IV(q) for j
i
i=a,b.  The first thing to note is that the benefits
functions equal zero where )q=0.  These points j
are highlighted by the dashed lines which show the7
initial probabilities associated with the two initial quality levels, q  and q .  Since the slope of the IV
a   b
function is equal to B times the marginal implicit price of quality, the slope of the IV function for a
is less for all increments in quality than is the slope for b.  As the increment of quality change goes to
± infinity, the slopes of the two benefit functions become the same, and approach 0 and $ /µ, q
respectively.  From the diagram, one can see that for "large" changes one would expect an
improvement in quality to be much more valuable than the absolute value of an equivalent decrease
in quality.
Of course, for policy purposes we are interested in the aggregate benefits function, not the
individual benefit functions.  Aggregate benefits are commonly given by the sum of the individuals
benefits functions (a weighted sum could also be used).  Since each of the individual benefits
functions is convex in q, any aggregate benefits function that is a sum of the individual benefits (or j
a weighted sum) will also be convex.  The next two sections discuss the extent to which the convexity
of B depends on the error terms and the linear indirect utility function.
A Brief Return to Certainty:  Is the convexity of the benefits function an underlying feature
of the discrete-choice framework, or is it simply an outcome of using expected welfare measures
(because of the stochastic terms in the indirect utility functions)?  Consider the welfare measure under
knowledge of the error terms, when the indirect utility function is linear in the site characteristics.  For
all individuals who initially choose j as best, CV = )q $/µ.  Thus, for initial changes in quality, the j 
slope of the aggregate benefits function is the sum of marginal implicit prices for those individuals
that actually choose site j; i.e., S $/µ where S is the number of individuals choosing alternative j.  As j     j
q increases, there will be individuals for whom alternative j becomes the best site.  Let the total j
number of individuals choosing site j under conditions q  be given by S .  For each of these additional j       j
1      1
individuals, the marginal benefit is also $/µ.  The slope of the aggregate benefits function is therefore
S× $/µ at q .  With sufficient smoothness in S , the aggregate benefits function would be increasing j    j            j










at an increasing rate if  S  is increasing in q .  This is true even though each individual's marginal j       j
1     1
benefit is constant.  When quality improves, it is the increase in the number of individuals choosing
j that leads to the convexity in the aggregate benefits function.  This is essentially the same as the
results when one accounts for the uncertainty regarding the error terms because the choice
probabilities,  B , should approximate S .  Thus, the potential for a convex benefits function is a due j      j
1      1
to the underlying discrete choices.  In particular, for any other specification of errors (e.g., normal),
the convexity result would remain if the resulting site choice probabilities are increasing in quality.
Therefore, the convexity result is not an artifact of the assumed error distribution.
Relaxing Linear Utility:  The convexity of aggregate benefits depends in part on the linear
specification of site utility.  However, even if the individual utility functions are all assumed to be
concave in site quality, the aggregate benefit function is not necessarily globally concave.  To see this,
consider the case where the individual utility functions are logarithmic in q.  Here,  j
(11)
Thus, the benefits function will be globally concave if $#1.  However, for any initial level of B , there j
0
will be some value of $ large enough so that the benefits function is locally convex.  With $>1, for
benefits to be locally concave, one must have B>($-1)/$ which leaves little leeway for local concavity. j
For example, if $=1.25, 1.5, and 2, respectively, then for benefits to be locally concave, B  must j
0
exceed 0.2, 0.33, and 0.5, respectively.  Of course, as q goes to infinity, the probability goes to 1.  So j
the benefits function would look like the site choice probabilities, initially increasing at an increasing
rate and ultimately increasing at a decreasing rate.
For the cases where indirect utility function are non-linear with respect to q, some simple
intuition can be provided regarding the shape of the benefits function.  The second derivative of the9
benefits function is composed of two effects.  The first is the effect of a change in q on the site choice j
probability B.  The second is the effect of changes in q on the marginal utility derived from visits to j                   j
site j which is zero in the linear model and negative if the site utility is concave in q.  Thus, whether j
the aggregate benefits function is convex or concave for increases in q depends on whether the j
diminishing effect on utility for site users (the second effect) is enough to offset the increases in utility
accruing to the new users (the first effect).  Consequently, concavity of V(q) is not sufficient to insure
global concavity of the aggregate benefits function.
Empirical Evidence in Literature:  There are some investigations of the effects of functional
form that have appeared in the contingent valuation literature (e.g., Boyle).  There is also a literature
on the effects of functional form in single site travel cost studies.  However, the issue has received less
attention in the context of the RUM travel cost method.  Moreover, the extent to which increments
of improvements in quality are larger than equivalent decrements in quality is largely an empirical
question.  There are some studies that report valuation results for a range of changes in an
environmental quality variable where one can see evidence of convexity in the estimated
environmental benefits.  Space precludes a complete review, but some examples include Jones and
Lupi, and Lupi et al.  In another example, Chen et al. compare multinomial probit and logit recreation
demand models and examine a range of quality changes using each model.  The welfare measures for
the both models exhibit similar degrees of convexity in the benefits for changes in site quality.
Illustrative Example
Here, a multinomial logit model is estimated using an indirect utility function where quality
enters in a linear and logarithmic form.  The model is a simplified version of one of the site choice
models of Jones and Sung (1993).  The illustration uses data for trips that were single-day trout and
salmon fishing trips to Great Lakes sites in Michigan.  Sites are defined as counties in Michigan with10
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Table 1:  Multinomial Logit Parameters Great Lakes shore line that are within 250
miles of an angler's home.  The sample
consists of 363 anglers, and the average
angler's choice set contains 21 sites.  Site
utility is a function of travel costs for
individual i to each site j, p , and a total catch ij
rate for trout and salmon species at each site j, q.  Site utility takes the linear-in-parameters form, j
V=&µp +$f(q).  For comparison, the model was estimated with f(q)=q and f(q)=ln(q).  The model ji jj                  jj    jj
estimation results are listed in Table 1.  The ln(q) model has a larger likelihood value.  Vuong's test
for non-nested models was also used to compare the linear to the logarithmic model (Vuong).  The
results imply that the ln(q) model provides a significantly better fit than the linear model for ">0.065.
Thus, there is some very weak support for the log form relative to the linear form.
Two benefit functions are derived from the above models in order to illustrate the effect of
functional forms on the shape of the benefit function.  For the first, catch rates are varied at a single
Lake Michigan county (Allegan).  For the second, catch rates are varied at all sites bordering Lake
Michigan (about half of the sites).  For each of these, the sample average per-trip values and sample
average choice probabilities are calculated for the range of catch rate changes.  These results are
presented in Table 2 and are graphed in the accompanying figures.  
Notice that unlike the linear model, the ln(q) model has the property that as q goes to zero, j
B goes to zero.  For catch rates, this is a sensible property since catch rates "near" zero becomes the j
same as eliminating the site.  Notice from the graphs that there is a striking difference between how
"fast" the B goes to zero for the single county compare to the probability of going to the entire lake. j
For the lakewide policy, the choice probabilities do not tail off until the reductions in catch rates
become very close to zero.  At a 95% reduction in catch rates at the entire lake, the choice11
probabilities have only fallen by 9%.  Of course, the linear model performs much worse in this regard.
As shown in the first rows of Table 2, reducing catch rates to zero in the linear model bears little
resemblance to a site closure.  For Allegan Co., reducing catch rates to zero results in a loss about 1/3
that of the site closure.  Strikingly, for Lake Michigan, reducing catch rates to zero results in a loss that
is only 5% of the site closure.
Discussion 
Space constraints preclude a complete discussion of the results, but a few observations can be
squeezed in.  The above results illustrate the effect that functional form can have on estimated
environmental values.  While the linear models examined here do not exhibit a large degree of
convexity, these are "per-trip" results that are conditioned on the number of Great Lakes trout and
salmon fishing trips being held constant.  With a participation level that models changes in trips, the
values for the linear model would show "more" convexity, and the values for the log model would
show "less" concavity.  The reason is that total trip changes would mitigate some of the losses and
enhance the gains.  For example, in Lupi et al. a 50% increase in catch rates is over twice as valuable
as a 50% decrease.  As the theory shows, this is a direct result of the substitution effects inherent in
the discrete choice framework.  The empirical examples also illustrate the potential hazards of using
the linear form to value extreme changes in site quality.
The possible convexity of the benefits function is a potential concern for using RUM type
models as part of a cost benefit analysis.  As demonstrated above, while the use of concave site utility
function can result in an aggregate benefits function that is concave, concave site utility functions are
not sufficient to guarantee global concavity for the aggregate benefits function.  The implications that
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Table 2: Some values used to plot the above benefit functions for proportional changes in catch rates.*
Vary catch rates at Allegan Co.
Avg. per-trip value Avg. site probabilities % of baseline prob.
linear log(q) linear  log(q) linear log(q)
Site elim. ($1.55) ($1.53) 0 0 0   0   
0.0001  ($0.48) ($1.51) 0.061 0.002  72% 2%
0.05  ($0.46) ($1.09) 0.062 0.027  73% 32%
0.1  ($0.44) ($0.94) 0.063 0.036  74% 42%
0.5  ($0.27) ($0.37) 0.072 0.067  85% 78%
1.0  $0.00 $0.00  0.085 0.086  100% 100%
1.5  $0.33 $0.26  0.100 0.098  118% 115%
2.0  $0.73 $0.47  0.118 0.108  138% 126%
3.0  $1.81 $0.80  0.158 0.123  185% 144%
Vary catch rates at all Lake Michigan counties
Avg. per-trip value Avg. lake probabilities % of baseline prob.
linear log(q) linear  log(q) linear log(q)
Site elim. ($62.07) ($63.38) 0 0 0   0  
0.0001  ($3.47) ($34.33) 0.598 0.426  98% 69%
0.05  ($3.30) ($12.48) 0.599 0.561  98% 91%
0.1  ($3.13) ($9.70) 0.600 0.574  98% 93%
0.5  ($1.76) ($3.00) 0.605 0.605  99% 98%
1.0  $0.00 $0.00  0.613 0.619  100% 100%
1.5  $1.81 $1.79  0.621 0.627  101% 101%
2.0  $3.67 $3.07  0.630 0.633  103% 102%
3.0  $5.60 $4.07  0.638 0.638  104% 103%
* Results are in 1984 dollars and are for site-choice only, i.e., total GL trout & salmon day-trips are held constant at initial level.13
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